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between 1997 and 2007. Instrumenting the variable of interest with histori-
cal concessions interacted with changes in international prices of minerals,
we unveil an ecological fallacy: Whereas concessions have no effect on the
number of conflicts at the territory level (lowest administrative unit), they
do foster violence at the district level (higher administrative unit). We de-
velop and validate empirically a theoretical model where the incentives of
armed groups to exploit and protect mineral resources explain our empirical
findings.
Keywords: Conflict, Natural Resources, Democratic Republic of the Congo
JEL Classification: Q34, O13, Q32, N57
1 Introduction
Over the last three decades a vast literature has developed around the concept of the re-
source curse. The resource curse broadly refers to the paradox that countries rich in non-
renewable natural resources tend to display poor economic performance.1 Conflict plays
a prominent role among the several channels proposed to explain this paradox: valuable
minerals foster civil wars which negatively affect economic performance (World Bank
2011). Yet, despite the large body of literature addressing the nexus, the evidence re-
1Recent contributions to the resource curse literature include Haber and Menaldo (2011),
Bruckner, Ciccone and Tesei (2012), Wacziarg (2012).
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mains mixed (Blattman and Miguel 2010, Van der Ploeg 2011). Collier and Hoeffler
(2004) show that countries with larger shares of primary commodity exports are more
likely to experience civil wars. However, several shortcomings of Collier and Hoeffler’s
(2004) study have been highlighted. First, primary commodities are not homogeneous.
As underlined by specialists of the field, there is an urge to categorize the various types
of natural resources into diffuse resources such as agricultural production, and point re-
sources such as mineral resources (Le Billon 2001, Wick and Bulte 2006), with the latter
being seen as more conflictive (Ross 2004). On theoretical grounds, point resources - as
opposed to diffuse resources - attract violent entrepreneurs that compete for the control
of the rents (Mehlum et al. 2002). Recognizing the specificities of mineral resources, a
series of papers have sought to identify the specific effect of mineral resources on civil
conflicts. The initial evidence based on cross-country analyses pointed at the undisputable
role played by mineral resources in both igniting and sustaining civil conflicts (Lujala et
al. 2005, Ross 2006, 2012, Lujala 2010).
Second, the relationship between mineral resources and conflict is potentially endoge-
nous. For instance, mineral resource dependence may be a direct consequence of actual
or expected civil war (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, 2009). The confounding role of
institutions is another source of endogeneity. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2005)
emphasize the role of oil revenues in weakening state capacity. More recently, Besley
and Persson (2010) formalize this argument by proposing a model of endogenous state
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capacity formation. They show that natural resource-rich countries will under-invest in
state capacity formation, and will therefore be more prone to experiencing civil conflicts.
Third, the cross-country nature of the early contributions to this debate fails to capture
the effects of within-country uneven distribution of resources. Cross-country analyses also
fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, Cotet and Tsui (2013) show
that oil does not affect civil war in a cross country estimation, once controlling for country
fixed effects. More recent studies adopted a micro-founded approach by exploiting within
country variations. By working with sub-national units of analysis, researchers can draw
more accurate causal inference. Buhaug and Rod (2006), Angrist and Kugler (2008), and
Dube and Vargas (2013) all identify a positive effect of the presence of natural resources
on the occurrence of conflict events. Using geo-referenced data at the 100 square kilo-
meter grid, Buhaug and Rod (2006) find a positive effect of oil and diamonds presence
on the likelihood of civil conflict. Both Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Dube and Vargas
(2013) study the impact of exogenous commodity-price shocks on the level of violence in
Colombia. The former show that positive price shocks on cocaine increased violence at
the department level, while the latter show that at the municipality level the effect of oil
and coffee prices increases have, respectively, a positive and negative effect on the number
of violent events.
Findings from a recent study by Ziemke (2008) on the civil conflict in Angola suggests
that mineral resources could work as a catalyst for peace, thus casting doubts upon the
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generalization of the above relationship between resources and conflict. More specifically,
this stydy shows using geo-referenced data that the presence of diamonds contained the
level of violence.
This paper enriches the micro-founded literature by focusing on the recent conflicts
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). More precisely, we estimate the impact
of geo-located granted mining concessions in DRC between January 1997 and December
2007 on the location of conflict events.
The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the dramatic consequences of the
level of analysis on the relationship between mineral resources and the incidence of con-
flict. By implementing a two-stage least square estimation at two geographical levels of
analysis, i.e. the territory and the district levels, we unveil an ecological fallacy: Although
there is no evidence that granted concessions affect the number of conflict events at the
territory level, they increase the frequency of conflicts at the district level.2
We propose a theoretical mechanism to rationalize these empirical findings, owing
much to the literature on crime displacement (Repetto 1976, Barr and Pease 1990, Brant-
ingham et al. 2012, Johnson et al. 2012).3 In line with anecdotal evidence, in our model
violence affects negatively mining profitability, thus providing strong incentives for min-
ing companies to keep fighting activities far from the production sites (Vlassenroot and
2The ecological fallacy refers to the erroneous assumption that relationships between variables
at a more aggregate level imply the same relationships at a less aggregated level. It has also been
called a problem of “aggregation bias” or a “modifiable area unit problem” (Wong 2009).
3Alternative explanations behind our empirical results are discussed in Section 6.
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Raeymaekers 2004, Raeymaekers 2010). This mechanism which we name the “protection
effect” helps explaining the ecological fallacy: valuable minerals do foster conflict, but
not in the immediate neighborhood of the mining sites where violence would disrupt the
profitability of the business. Revisiting our econometrics by allowing for a heterogeneous
spatial effect of mining concessions on conflict validates the theoretical findings.
This paper, therefore, sheds light on seemingly contradictory findings in the literature
and it highlights the role of the spatial dimension in the empirical literature on conflicts.
Our results suggest that valuable minerals do generate violent conflict, but since fighting
tends to be located at some distance from the mining sites, the relationship can be iden-
tified only by choosing a sufficiently large unit of analysis or by carefully accounting for
spatial spillover effects. Failing to do so may result in a non-significant relationship, as
in our study, or even generate opposite predictions if the “protection effect” is sufficiently
strong at the local level.
2 Background
Since 1996 the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has experienced a succession of
wars and lower scale conflicts that according to a survey of the International Rescue Com-
mittee have been the cause of more than five million deaths over the 1998-2008 period
(IRC 2008) and an estimated 1.7 million internally displaced people (Internal Displace-
ment Monitoring Center 2011). Whether or not these exact figures are biased (Spiegel
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and Robinson 2010), their magnitude is indicative of the lethality of these conflicts and
of the disruptive impact they had on local living conditions (Pellillo 2012). The causes of
the Congo Wars are multiple, complex, and intermingled: the weakness and inefficiency
of Mobutu’s regime, ethnic polarization, spillover effects from the Rwandan genocide,
regional control by foreign powers and natural wealth have all been listed among the key
factors (Prunier 2009, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004).
The first Congolese War (1996-1997) started when Laurent Désiré Kabila, heading
the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) and sup-
ported by the foreign governments of Rwanda, Uganda and other neighboring countries,
contested Mobutu’s leadership. The second Congolese war (1998-2003) had an even more
international dimension since rival countries and factions saw in the conflict-hit DRC a
convenient ground for waging proxy-wars. Although the end of the second war meant a
retreat of international actors from the battlefield, it did not lead to the dissolution of the
numerous rival armed groups and gangs that had formed over the course of the 7 years
wars. In fact the violence in DRC continues to affect the country’s stability, especially in
its Eastern regions.
Congo’s natural wealth in mineral resources has been consistently blamed as the main
driver of the violence, either as a way to finance warring parties or as a warfare objective
in itself (Congdon Fors and Olsson 2004, Turner 2007, International Alert 2010, Gambino
2011, Stearns 2011). Although Austesserre (2012) warns about the dangers of focusing
7
exclusively on the role of mineral exploitation as a cause of violence in the country, it is
hardly deniable that many Congolese mining locations have been looted and the minerals
exported illegally over the years by both Congolese and foreign armed groups (Montague
2002, Congdon Fors and Olsson 2004, Prunier 2009, Freedman 2011).
The anecdotal evidence is extensive. Over the years the United Nations has repeatedly
issued reports of experts, of the UN Security Council, and of the UN Secretary General
underlining that natural resources have shaped and fueled the conflicts in DRC. There
is evidence that both foreign and Congolese armies were directly involved in large-scale
looting of mineral resources: regular soldiers were reported to force the mines’ managers
to “open the coffers and doors. The soldiers were then ordered to remove the relevant
products and load them into vehicles” (Stearns 2011). Valuable minerals are reported
to have motivated the military intervention of neighboring countries such as Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda, especially after the end of the first Congolese War. Stearns (2011:
297) reporting the interview of a pilot highly involved in military and mineral transporta-
tion during the Congolese wars observes how: “Rwanda’s shifting priorities [between the
security imperative during the first Congolese war and the business objectives during the
second] became clear to Pierre [a pilot interviewed] in his flights. He flew their troops
into mining areas, where Rwandan commanders would be in charge of loading tons of
tin and coltan [a high value mineral used in the manufacturing of electronic devices] into
airplanes”.
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The Ituri province provides another good example of the dynamics around the con-
trol of minerals. Three main armed groups were actively contesting the control of the
local gold deposits: Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), Front des Nationalistes et In-
tégrationnistes (FNI), and the Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais (FAPC). According to
International Alert 2010, “The FAPC and the FNI clashed over the control of Djalasiga.
The UPC held Mongbwalu up until 2003 and were then replaced by the FNI, who were
succeeded by the first brigade of the FARDC [the Congolese Army] to be deployed in
Ituri. [...] It should be recalled that in their first deployment in Ituri in 2005, the Con-
golese Army immediately established itself at the mining sites of Mongbwalu and Bambu,
from where they drove off the local militia by force, with no regard for the local civilian
population.”
3 Baseline Analysis
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the monthly variations of two variables. First, the
dependent variable is the monthly sum of conflict events by territories or districts, as
recorded in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED, Raleigh 2010). More
than 3,000 conflict events occurred from January 1997 to December 2007, including
2,627 violent events. Figure 1 shows that most conflict events are concentrated in Orien-
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tale, North and South Kivu provinces, followed by the territory of Pweto in the Katanga
province and Kinshasa. The geographical dispersion of the data tracks the degree to which
various areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been affected by con-
flict, thus giving us confidence regarding the data quality. The relevance of Kinshasa is
explained by the strategic and political importance of the capital city in the Congolese
conflicts.
Over time, the evolution of conflict events exhibits large monthly variations. As il-
lustrated in Figure 2, several peaks can be observed in May 1997, January 2001, June
2003, November 2005, January 2006, December 2006 and in particular, in August 1998,
November 1999, January 2000 and October 2008. Conflict events occurring after 2007
are not included in our sample due to other data constraints. The conflict trend based on
ACLED data tracks well-documented increases of violence in DRC reported by secondary
literature (see e.g. Turner 2007).
We further validate our dependent variable by comparing the distribution of ACLED
conflict events with the number of conflicts recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram’s (UCDP’s) Georeferenced Events Datasets (Sundberg et al. 2010 ). The UCDP
data adopt a more restrictive definition of conflict events and only comprise events report-
ing at least one direct death. Over the period investigated, there have been 967 conflict
events recorded by UCDP in contrast with 2,627 violent events in the ACLED dataset.
Despite the difference of coding, the geographical distribution of UCDP conflict events
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in Figure 3 provides a fairly similar picture to the one depicted in Figure 1. In one of our
robustness checks we show that our main results are qualitatively identical when using
UCDP conflict data.
Second, the main variable of interest relates to the mining concessions. Based on data
provided by the Ministry of Mining (5,549 mining concessions granted over the period),
we construct the monthly sum of mining concessions granted by territory or district. We
will also use the size of these new concessions as an alternative proxy. The minerals in-
volved include Gold, Copper, Diamonds, Lead, Silver, Tin, Zinc, Palladium, Tungsten,
and Iron Ore. There are several types of mining concessions with different permits and
associated fees. Due to sample size limitations, we do not distinguish between the two
broad categories: research and exploitation. The research permit confers to its owner the
exclusive right to conduct, within the scope of which it is established and for the dura-
tion of its validity, the research work of the mineral substances classified as mines for
which the permit is granted. The permit of exploitation gives its owner the exclusive right
to perform, inside the perimeter on which it is established and for the duration of maxi-
mum thirty years, the research, development, construction and exploitation of minerals for
which the permit is established. A logarithm transformation is applied to the concession-
related variables (adding the value 0.1 when there is no concession) to ease interpretation,
although results are still robust without such transformation. In our database, concessions
were granted in 1968, 1969, 1970, 1986 and between 1994 and 2007. Figure 4 indicates
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that mining concessions are mainly granted in Eastern and Southern DRC, which is con-
sistent with the geological conditions of the country. Visually comparing Figures 1, 3 and
4 suggests that mining concessions may be spatially correlated with conflict.
The nature of the relationship studied in this work requires some caution due to the
intrinsic data limitation. First, conflict events may be measured with error. For instance, it
is not unlikely that events in very insecure areas have received little news coverage, lead-
ing to an underestimation of violence in the most affected areas (Verpoorten 2012). We
run our analysis with the most widely used dataset on African conflicts and validate our
results by checking the robustness of our finding to the adoption of the alternative UCDP
dataset. Secondly, the cadastral mapping of property rights and mineral concessions may
also be inaccurate. This would lead to measurement error in the mining concessions data.
We cannot exclude, for instance, that more stable regions feature a more accurate registra-
tion of mineral concessions. The IV strategy we employ, described in details in the next
section, partly corrects for this.
Finally, following Miguel et al. (2004), we control for rainfall as a measure for the
climate-induced changes in agricultural income in poorly irrigated countries. Agriculture
is likely to represent the default economic activity for the vast majority of the popula-
tion in DRC. Consequently, changes in agricultural income may affect both the incen-
tives for individuals to join armed groups and the profitability of mining via the labor
market. Rainfall data are measured by the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
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tion (NASA) using a one degree latitude-longitude grid. We follow a standard approach
to transform rainfall data into “anomalies”, i.e. deviations from normal rainfall condi-
tions. More specifically, the anomalies are computed at the unit of observation (territory
or district) and measure the deviations from the long-term monthly mean, divided by its
monthly long-run standard deviation. A positive (negative) anomaly therefore signals
abnormally high (low) rainfall. The monthly basis is chosen to correct for seasonality
patterns of rainfall data, while the long-run period is defined by the longest period of
available data (1997-2010). We introduce the quadratic term of rainfall anomalies to al-
low for a detrimental impact of excessive rainfall deviations as compared to the normal
conditions. Our central results depend neither on the inclusion of rainfall anomalies nor
its quadratic term.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of these variables. Given the relatively long
time period used, the non-stationary nature of our variables may be a point of concern,
leading to possible spurious relationships (Maddala and Wu 1999). We perform the Fisher
panel data unit root test on the dependent and the explanatory variables (see Table 2). The
tests reject the null hypothesis that the series in the panel contain a unit root. All series
are stationary at any reasonable level of confidence.
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3.2 Identification Strategy
Our analysis exploits monthly (t) and geographical (i) variations in the occurrence of con-
flict events (Conflictsi,t) and granting of mining concessions (Concessionsi,t) between
January 1997 and December 2007 in order to draw causal inference on the role of new or
future mining activities on the level of violence in DRC. The period under investigation
is dictated by data availability, which implies that our analysis is limited to the incidence
of local conflict events rather than on the onset of the first Congolese war (end of 1996).
Using sub-national within-variations, we are mainly capturing the local dynamics of the
relationship between mining concessions and conflicts while failing to capture the wider
geopolitical dimensions. Ideally we would like to estimate the following equation:
Conflictsi,t = αi + αt + βConcessionsi,t + i,t (1)
Yet, despite the introduction of territory/district fixed effects (αi) and a series of month-
year time dummies (αt), in estimating (1) we are likely to face severe endogeneity prob-
lems (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008, 2009). In our case, the granting of mineral con-
cessions may be highly endogenous because of simultaneity as mining companies might
be less likely to invest in conflict-prone areas, or because of omitted factors since the
granting of concessions may be driven by local politics that could equally directly influ-
ence the occurrence of conflict. In addition, measurement problems for conflict events
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and in the cadastral data are likely to correlate with conflict events thereby introducing
additional biases. To deal with these methodological challenges, our estimation relies
instead on an IV strategy similar to Brückner and Ciccone (2010). We exploit histor-
ical concessions coupled with changes in international prices of minerals to assess the
causal relationship between mining concessions and conflict. Historical concessions are
defined as those granted before 1986. Mineral-specific international prices are taken from
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s Commodity price statistics
and are normalized.4 A price index is then constructed by interacting the number of past
concessions of mineral j in location i (PastConci,j) with the time-varying international
prices of the mineral j the mining concessions extract or aim at extracting (Pj,t). The
constructed index may be expressed as follows:5
PriceIndexi,t =
∑
j
PastConci,jPj,t
The two-stage least square estimation is implemented at two geographical levels of anal-
ysis, the territory and the district levels. A linear specification is adopted as non-linear
methods in a two-stage framework imply strong specification assumptions (Angrist and
4If reported to be traded on different markets in the UNCTAD dataset, we select the US market
as the international reference. The prices are normalized to 100 for the first month of 1997. The
prices of Copper, Nickel, Zinc and Lead are not available for April 1998, which explains the slight
reduction of observations for the price index compared to other variables (see Table 1).
5Notice that similar results are found when the price index is expressed as a proportion, i.e.
when PastConci,j is divided by
∑
j PastConcj .
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Krueger 2001). Accordingly, our estimating equations are the following:
Conflictsi,t = αi + αt + β1 ̂Concessionsi,t + β2Rainfalli,t + i,t
Concessionsi,t = α
′
i + α
′
t + γ1PriceIndexi,t + γ2Rainfalli,t + i,t
We add rainfall anomalies (Rainfalli,t) to control for changes in the opportunity cost to
fight that are unrelated to mining concessions. To control for other unobserved factors,
our estimates introduce territory/district fixed effects (αi) and a series of month-year time
dummies (αt).
The use of time-varying international prices, coupled with historical concessions, pro-
vides an exogenous shock on the probability to grant a new mining concession of a partic-
ular mineral type. The rationale for using international prices as an exogenous variation
is that conflicts in one particular territory or district of the DRC cannot alone affect the
international prices of these minerals.6
Changes in international prices instead do affect the demand for mining concessions:
an increase in international prices should increase the attractiveness of obtaining a new
mining concession, given higher expected revenues. This is particularly true in areas
where concessions of similar minerals have been granted in the past. The reasons may
6The price of Coltan is excluded from the construction of the price index to ensure the exoge-
nous nature of the price index as an instrument. DRC is indeed one of the major Coltan producers,
producing in 2001 about 4 percent of the World production (Roskill Information Services 2002).
However, the results remain unaltered when the price of Coltan is included in the price index. In
that case, coltan prices are derived from Roskill Information Services (2002) and the US Geolog-
ical Survey. We thank Olivier Dagnelie for sharing that data.
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be related not only to the physical presence of these minerals but also to the investments
needed to exploit these minerals such as investments in infrastructure, as well as the local
labor market conditions, the existing contractual arrangements, etc. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that changes in prices may have an immediate impact on mining exploitation and
demand for concessions.7
Our identification strategy relies on the validity of our instrumental variable. While
the relevance of that instrument may be directly tested, the exclusion restriction may be
questioned. We assume the constructed price index to be uncorrelated with the error terms,
which implies that this index affects conflicts exclusively through the contemporaneous
granting of concessions. Asserting that the international prices of minerals are exogenous
is a reasonable assumption.
Our exclusion restriction, however, also requires that the unobserved political discre-
tionary rules affecting the granting of mining concessions are different for the more recent
mining concessions under Laurent Désiré Kabila and his son Joseph (1997-2007) and for
the historical concessions granted under the Mobutu’s regime. Notice first the different
geographical origin of the leaders (Orientale province for Mubutu and Katanga province
for Kabila) and their ethnic origin (Ngbandi for the former and Luba for the later) sug-
gests that the rules of discretion in the granting of concessions are unlikely to have been
the same over the two periods. Anecdotal evidence on the way mining concessions have
7For example, The Economist reports how mining companies came from all over the world to
deal with the Governor of Katanga, home to about 5 percent of the world’s copper and nearly half
its cobalt, following the record rises in prices for these minerals (The Economist 2011).
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been granted in the two periods seems to support our exclusion restriction. Under Mobutu,
the mining sector was entirely nationalized and mining concessions were largely under the
control of the centralized and authoritarian regime. Mining revenues were used to “fund
Mobutu’s patronage network instead of reinvesting earnings into infrastructure and de-
velopment” (Stearns 2011: 289). The rules of the game changed in 1995 when Mobutu
allowed his prime minister, Kenga wa Dondo, to gradually privatize the mining sector. In
1997, “the rebellion [led by Laurent-Desire kabila] applied its half-Marxist, half-liberal
approach to mining, adopting a slipshod policy that imposed harsh conditions on large
foreign companies while favoring shadowy investors who often lacked the resources and
expertise necessary to develop mining concessions” (Stearns 2011:290).
Finally, the economic conditions surrounding the mining concessions experienced im-
portant changes between the two periods. In the early years of Mobutu, characterized by
high prices for copper, gold, and cobalt, the mining sector was the largest source of em-
ployment and income in DRC. In the 1990s, low international prices for key exported
minerals coupled with years of mismanagement dampened the profitability of mining ac-
tivities. “Exports declined from a high of 465,000 tons in 1988 to 38,000 tons just before
the war, while cobalt production slipped from 10,000 to 4,000 tons in the same period.
Similar trends affected all other mineral exports” (Stearns 2011: 289).
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3.3 Empirical Results
In Table 3, we report the results of a simple OLS and the two-stage least square estimation
as described in the preceding section.8 Notice first that a naive OLS regression largely
underestimates the relationship between mining concessions and conflict and results in
a non significant negative relationship. The downward bias suggests that all else equal,
mining companies are looking for locations where conflict is less likely to occur.
Moving to the IV model, at both levels of analysis (territory and district), the price
index appears to be highly relevant: it strongly and positively affects the probability of
granting a mining concession. The F-Test on excluded instruments allows us to unam-
biguously dismiss the risk of weak instruments. We also use a just-identified equation,
which is known to be approximately unbiased. When we run our analysis at the territorial
level we find no evidence for granted mining concessions to affect the risk of conflict (Re-
gressions (3) and (4) of Table 3). At the district level, however, the instrumented mining
concessions significantly increase the risk of conflict, and in particular of violent conflicts
(Regressions (7) to (8) of Table 3). The magnitude of the impact is substantial: at the
district level, given the mean number of conflict events reported in Table 3, a 10 percent
increase in the number of mining concessions would increase the likelihood of conflict by
about 29 percent.9 Adopting standard errors clustered at the district/territory level does
8In the supplementary materials we provide more parsimonious specifications of both models,
without FE, without rainfall variables.
9This effect is computed based on regressions (7) of Table 3.
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not affect the results.
We examine the solidity of these findings implementing three different sets of robust-
ness test. All results are condensed in Table 4, where we report only the coefficient for
concessions in the second stage. The first stage (not reported) is always significant, and
all models control for rainfall anomalies, year month fixed effects, and district/territory
fixed effects.
First, we assess the importance of specific locations and conflict periods in establish-
ing our result. Indeed, our findings may be mainly driven by the very high concentration
of violent events in some territories/districts. A first concern is that the violence in Kin-
shasa depicted in Figure 3 may capture another channel, such as the strategic value of
the capital or the increased state capacity following price-induced changes in mining rev-
enue. In panel A of Table 4 we show that our findings are robust to the exclusion of the
capital district (or the two corresponding territories), Kinshasa, from the sample. A dif-
ferent concern is that our results are not sufficiently representative of the entire country
because they could be driven by the mining-related violence occurring in eastern DRC
and in particular in the region of Kivu (North and South Kivu provinces). We re-run our
two-stage fixed effect estimation, excluding the Kivu region from the sample (see Panel B
of Table 4). The magnitude of the coefficients is reduced as a consequence of the conflict
intensity in the Kivus, but the significant positive impact obtained at the district level is
confirmed. Mining activities and violence occurring in North and South Kivu are clearly
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important to explain the role of mining resources in fueling conflict but the results are
also valid for other parts of the country. Our results are also robust to the exclusion of any
individual province from the sample.10 A related concern is whether the link we identify
between mining and conflict describes the entire period of violence in DRC. Our results
in Panel C of Table 4, in which we restrict the analysis to the period after the signing of
the official peace agreement in June 2003, suggest that mineral resources continue having
a substantial role in shaping violence after the termination of two official Congolese wars.
The second set of robustness checks addresses the validity of the exclusion restriction.
Beyond the qualitative arguments given in the previous section on the reasonable nature
of our identifying assumption, we alter the sample to assess more directly the validity
of that assumption. One potential concern is that changes in international prices may
revive mining in historical concessions as well, thereby affecting nearby conflict. This
would then constitute a different channel than the granting of new concessions and it
would endanger our exclusion restriction. We know that concessions are granted for a
maximum of thirty years. We therefore check the robustness of our results to the exclusion
of the territory/district affected by the granting of a concession in 1986 and to limiting the
sample to the post-April 2000 period (30 years after the last concession granted in 1970).
The results, reported in Panels D and E of Table 4, remain qualitatively identical.
Third, our results are robust to alternative definitions of the main variables of interest
10Results provided on request.
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and of the dependent variable (Panels F to J of Table 4). First, if we repeat our estima-
tion using the logged size of the concessions (instead of the number of concessions), we
obtain qualitatively identical results. Second, not proceeding to the logarithmic transfor-
mation of the concessions variable or adopting the alternative definition of the mining
concessions evaluated on the basis of the year of demand (instead of the year of granting),
does not affect our findings either. As for the dependent variable, our results are robust
to the adoption of the UCDP conflict database, which records conflict events with at least
one death. Similarly, qualitatively identical results are obtained when the dependent vari-
able is replaced by a dummy variable indicating whether the concerned geographical unit
records at least one conflict event for one particular month (using consequently a linear
probability model). Finding similar results with the linear probability model suggests that
the number of mining concessions may also affect the “extensive margin” of conflicts,
following similar mechanisms as the “intensive margin” of conflicts.
In sum, we find robust evidence that mineral concessions significantly increase the
likelihood of violence at the district level, while no evidence is found for such a link at the
territory level. This result constitutes a case of ecological fallacy or aggregation problem,
i.e. a misleading assumption that the relationship observed at an aggregated level (e.g.
district) implies the same relationship at a different level of aggregation (e.g. territory).
In the next section, a simple theoretical model is geared to explain this puzzling finding.
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4 Theoretical Framework
We consider a region represented by a unit-length line inhabited by a uniformly distributed
continuum of individuals of unit mass. These individuals are each endowed with a unit
amount of time. We assume without loss of generality that all concessions are located at
the line’s origin. Concessions operating in the region belong to a mine-extraction com-
pany controlled by incumbent i. A challenger c endeavors taking over the region hosting
the mining concessions by violent means. We model the externality of the ensuing conflict
on the mining business as an increased cost of inputs.
Labor constitutes the unique input of the mining activity, and we assume that the
mining company is a local monopsonist on the labor market. The profits from controlling
the mining concession, pi, read as follows:
pi(xm, dv;A) = (ϕ(xm)− ym(xm, dv))nxm (2)
where ϕ is the unit return to labor when employed in mining, which we assume concave
in the number of workers active in the mine, xm. The parameter n captures the size or
number of mining concessions. The workers are remunerated at the (endogenous) wage of
ym. The monopsonist will therefore determine the demand for mining labor. Individuals
specialize either in mining, or farming. The number of farmers is denoted by xf = 1−xm.
The farming activity yields an income yf . Mining is remunerated at the wage ym, yet the
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miners have to incur the unit commuting cost of (1−dv)τ reach the mining company from
their initial location, where dv is the distance of conflict from the location of the mine. An
individual k located at a distance dk from the mine prefers working in the mining sector
instead of farming if ym ≥ yf + (1− dv)τdi. Notice that the proximity of conflict to the
mining sites increases the commuting cost for miners, thereby reducing their net wage.
The incumbent maximizes his payoff with respect to three choice variables: (i) the
number of miners xm, (ii) the amount of soldiers to deploy against the challenger, xi,
given the exogenous unit cost y¯ of the soldiers11, and (iii) the location of its army, dv,
given an increasing and convex deployment cost c(dv).12 We describe the probability that
the incumbent beats the challenger by the function p(xi, xc, dv), with xc standing for the
challenger’s number of soldiers, and the fighting technology satisfying some very general
assumptions:
p(xi, xc, dv) =
g(xi)e(dv)
e(dv)g(xi) + g(xc)
, g
′
(xj) > 0 , g
′′
(xj), e
′
(dv), e
′′
(dv) < 0 , j = {i, c}
The probability that the incumbent is victorious in a confrontation with the challenger is
assumed to depend positively on the incumbent’s army strength g(xi), and on his relative
fighting efficiency e(dv), while it is a negative function of the challenger’s strength g(xc).
11Making the fighters’ remuneration endogenous would unnecessarily complicate the model.
Indeed, having assumed that the pool of workers is not influenced by the number of fighters re-
cruited, the endogenous remuneration of the latter would simply amount to a rescaling of our
results.
12All results remain qualitatively unchanged if the deployment cost is linear.
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Moreover, we are assuming that the incumbent’s relative fighting efficiency is the highest
when his troops are deployed close to the incumbent’s headquarters and that this fighting
efficiency is monotonically decreasing in dv.
Notice that deploying the army farther from the mines has three effects: first, it de-
creases the cost of labor (as it increases the net wage offered to miners); second, it in-
creases the costs of deployment, c (dv); and third, it reduces the efficiency of fighting of
the army, as soldiers have to patrol a larger territory.
The utility of the incumbent is therefore given by:
ui = p(xi, xc, dv)pi(xm, dv)− y¯xi − c (dv) (3)
Since the labor force, x, has two occupational choices and the commuting cost, τ , is
incurred by the workers, it follows that for a mining wage ym, any individual lying on the
interval [0, dm] prefers mining to farming, where dm is defined as:
dm =
ym − yf
τ(1− dv)
We thus have the mining labor supply as follows:
xsm =

ym−yf
τ(1−dv) if
ym−yf
τ(1−dv) ≤ 1
1 otherwise
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It then follows that the inverse labor supply function is given by:
ym =

τxm(1− dv) + yf if xsm ≤ 1
τ(1− dv) + yf otherwise
We can now write the incumbent’s maximization problem as follows:
max
xm,dv ,xi
{
g(xi)e(dv)
e(dv)g(xi) + g(xc)
[ϕ(xm)− τxm(1− dv)− yf ]nxm − y¯xi − c(dv)
}
(4)
Optimizing yields the following first order conditions:
∂ui
∂xm
= p(xi, xc, dv)n
(
ϕ(xm)− yf + ϕ′(xm)xm − 2τ(1− dv)xm
)
= 0 (5)
∂ui
∂dv
=
e
′
(dv)g(xi)g(xc)
(e(dv)g(xi) + g(xc))2
pi(xm, dv) + p(xi, xc, dv)τnx
2
m − c
′
(dv) = 0 (6)
∂ui
∂xi
=
g
′
(xi)g(xc)e(dv)
(e(dv)g(xi) + g(xc))2
pi(xm, dv)− y¯ = 0 (7)
We show in the appendix that the incumbent’s utility function is quasi-concave in the
decision variables, and this is sufficient to deduce that an equilibrium exists.
The challenger’s optimization problem is analogously given by:
max
xc
{
g(xc)
e(dv)g(xi) + g(xc)
pi(xm, dv)− y¯xc
}
(8)
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Optimizing gives the following F.O.C.:
∂uc
∂xc
=
g
′
(xc)g(xi)e(dv)
(e(dv)g(xi) + g(xc))2
pi(xm, dv)− y¯ = 0 (9)
And it is straightforward to show that the challenger’s objective function is concave in xc.
Having showed that the problem is well behaved, we can deduce that a Nash Equi-
librium for this game exists (see Mas-Colell et al. 1995, proposition 8.D.3). Moreover,
by combining equations (7) and (9), we can deduce that g
′
(xi)g(xc) = g
′
(xc)g(xi), and
since g(.) is a concave function it is necessary that xi = xc. Equipped with these results,
we can now conduct comparative statics on the parameter of interest.
Comparative statics - Changes in the size of the mining industry
Using Condition (5) and by the Implicit Function Theorem we can derive the follow-
ing expression:
dx∗m
dn
= −p(xi, xc, dv)∂pi(xm, dv)/∂xm
∂2ui
∂x2m
(10)
The numerator is nil, as it equals the first order condition in (5) up to a multiplicative
term n. Because the size of the concession n linearly affects the profitability of mining,
changing the size or the number of the mining concessions, therefore, does not affect the
optimal number of miners: both the marginal cost of hiring an additional worker, and his
marginal return for the company are unaffected by the increase in n. This does not mean,
however, that the industry has not become more profitable, rather, the incumbent will see
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his profits increase proportionally to the size of the mines he controls
Proceeding likewise with condition (6) we obtain:
dd∗v
dn
= −
p(xi, xc, dv)
(
e
′
(dv)g(xc)
e(dv)g(xi)+g(xc)
pi(xm, dv)/n+ τx
2
m
)
∂2ui
∂d2v
> 0 (11)
Using the first order condition in (6), we deduce that the numerator of (11) is equal to
expression (6) to which we substract its third term and divide the whole expression by n,
thus implying that the numerator of (11) is positive and that ∂d∗v/∂n > 0.
The net effect of an increase in the size of the concessions on the optimal location of
conflict is the result of two opposing forces. On the one hand the incentives to protect a
resource that has become more valuable are higher, thus pushing the incumbent to wage
conflict farther from the mining location so that the mining activity is less disrupted. On
the other hand, however, the same force induces the incumbent to reduce the distance
of combat to the mine so that his troops’ efficiency be enhanced. Eventually, since the
marginal cost of troop deployment is unaffected by an increase in the number of mining
sites, it follows that the marginal benefit from moving the conflict farther from the mining
location outmatches the marginal cost in terms of foregone fighting efficiency.
Finally, we can derive the effect of a change in n on the intensity of conflict by using
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Condition (7):
dx∗i
dn
= − g
′
(xi)g(xc)e(dv)
(e(dv)g(xi) + g(xc))2
∂pi(xm, dv)/∂n
∂2u∗i
∂x2i
> 0 (12)
The sign of this expression is as expected since, the marginal benefit of additional soldiers
on the ground follows the increase in mining profits, while the marginal cost of this oper-
ation remains unchanged. As a consequence the incumbent will deploy more troops, and
given the strategic complementarity between the forces of the incumbent and those of the
challenger, the latter will equally deploy more troops at equilibrium.
5 Revisiting the empirical analysis
Our theoretical model suggests that the impact of mining concessions on conflict is non-
homogeneous across space. In particular, increasing the size or number of mining sites
has the potential not only of increasing overall conflict intensity but also of displacing
violent events farther from mineral deposits. Anecdotal evidence in support for this thesis
abunds. The weak state capacity in most of the DRC enabled armed groups, including
the FADRC, to profit from minerals not only through direct looting but also by granting
protection to mining sites in exchange for a participation to the mining industry’s profits
(de Koning 2011, Fessy 2010, Spittaels 2010, Raeymaekers 2010, Verweijen 2013). This
military-turned businessman formula has been shown to improve local governance (Raey-
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maekers 2010, Sanchez de la Serra 2013), echoing the works of Gambetta (1993) on the
business-promoting consequences of the Sicilian Mafia. According to these accounts, a
displacement of violence occurred at times where armed groups would focus their atten-
tion on the protection of a particular mining location (de Koning 2011, U.N. presidential
statement S/2010/596, Rudahigwa 2010). The following quote from de Koning (2011:
26) is particularly illuminating: “Clearly the controlling military actor stands to gain by
establishing a minimum level of stability in which miners and traders can operate. [. . . ]
In this, these actors either mimic the operations of private businesses or operate in part-
nership with them, offering means of production and transport, as well as a degree of
protection. [. . . ] Finally, when driven by economic interests, FARDC troop deployments
focus on major mines and trading centres, leaving smaller mines and communities vul-
nerable to looting by armed groups. According to the UN Group of Experts, a number of
villages in Walikale that were looted and where mass rapes took place in early July 2010
had no security presence because FARDC units in the area were competing for control of
the Bisie mines.”. A recent study of Sanchez de la Sierra (2013) provides micro-founded
evidence that rises in mineral prices incentivize armed groups to better protect and tax
at the local level in Eastern DRC, hence unveiling a sort of proto-state building. Such
decentralized development of state capacity is fully consistent with our own theory that
we next attempt to highlight by incorporating the spatial dimension in the econometric
analysis.
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A first empirical indication of such spatial dependency is given in Table 5. The La-
grange Multiplier (LM) tests performed in columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 suggest significant
spatial lags and error correlations at the territory level.
To explicitly assess the importance of spatial spillovers, we consider two models.
First, we assess the role of spatially lagged mineral concessions, following Florax and
Folmer (1992). We apply the method to our panel analysis following Anselin (2002). We
augment equations (2) with a spatially lagged explanatory variable in the following way:
Conflictsi,t = αi + αt + β1 ̂Concessionsi,t + β2 ̂WConcessionsi,t
+ β3Rainfalli,t + i,t
Concessionsi,t = α
′
i + α
′
t + φ1PriceIndexi,t + φ2WPriceIndexi,t (13)
+ φ3Rainfalli,t + 
′
i,t
WConcessionsi,t = α
′′
i + α
′′
t + θ1PriceIndexi,t + θ2WPriceIndexi,t
+ θ3Rainfalli,t + 
′′
i,t
We use a distance-based spatial matrix based on the inverse distance decay function.
WConcessionsi,t andWPriceIndexi,t are weighted sums of the concession-based vari-
ables and price indices at other locations. We can, for instance, express the variable
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WConcessionsi,t as follows:
WConcessionsi,t =
∑
j 6=i
wijConcessionsj,t where wij =
d−γij∑
j d
−γ
ij
Where γ takes the values 1 or 2 as these are the most common integers used in spatial
econometrics (Anselin 2002).
Second, we also estimate spatial panel models with time and location fixed effects
using Matlab routines and methods developed by Elhorst (2003, 2010) . The estimation
approach includes the bias correction procedure proposed by Lee and Yu (2011) for spatial
panel data models containing spatial and/or time-period fixed effects. Because of the
absence of convincing evidence of the presence of spatial correlation at the district level,
in addition to possible small sample bias with respect to districts (only 38), we discuss
only territory level estimates.
Estimating the system of equations (13), Table 6 indicates that at the territory level
(regressions (1) to (2)) the granting of mining concessions in the neighboring territory
significantly increases the risk of conflict (especially violent conflicts). The coefficient of
the non-spatially lagged variable is negative and significantly different from zero. Table
6 indicates that these results are robust to the use of an alternative spatial matrix of order
1, instead of 2 (regressions (3) and (4) in Table 6). In regressions (5) and (6) of Table
6, we report estimation results using explicit spatial models for panel data based on the
methods developed by Elhorst (2003, 2010), along with the bias correction procedure
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proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) for spatial panel data models containing spatial and/or
time-period fixed effects. The results suggest the existence of significant spillovers in
conflict intensity in both the error term and the spatial dependent variable. In other words,
conflicts erupting in territories are not independent from each other; consequently, any
strategy to address these conflicts should be comprehensive and inclusive. Even with
these spatial specifications, our estimates remain very stable. Based on regressions (6)
Table 6 and given the mean number of conflict events reported in Table 1, a 10 percent
increase in the number of mining concessions would respectively decrease the likelihood
of conflict events by about 60 percent in the same territory. However, a similar increase in
the number of the concessions would also increase the number of conflicts by about 165
percent in the neighboring territory. At the district level, no spatial effect is found. As
in Section 3.3, results are robust to alternative definitions of the mining concessions and
conflict variables and to subsample analyses.
Overall, these result are consistent with the theoretical prediction that a larger num-
ber of mining sites increases the protection effect thereby reducing violence around the
mine(s); gives the incentives to the incumbent to move the conflict location farther from
the mining site (potentially in a neighboring territory); and results in a higher level of
violence at the aggregate level (adequately captured at the district level). While caution is
usually called when interpreting spillover effects as causal (Corrado and Fingleton 2011),
the theoretical model developed in the previous section supports such interpretation and
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allows us to go beyond purely data-analytic considerations. Our results are therefore sup-
portive of the spatially-based theoretical mechanisms proposed in the previous section
and are likely to explain what appeared to be an ecological fallacy in Section 3.3. In other
words, the absence of a statistically significant relationship between mining concessions
and (violent) conflicts at the territory level in our baseline regression is driven by an omit-
ted spatial effect, explained by the incumbent’s incentives to protect the mining business.
When spatial spillovers are taken into account, a mining concession tends to decrease the
risk of conflict in the same territory but increases the risk in neighboring territories. That
in turn explains why a change in the size (or number) of concessions would translate at a
more aggregated effect (i.e. the district level) into an increase in conflict intensity.
6 Alternative explanations
In interpreting our empirical results we propose an explanation based on the incentives of
extractive companies to protect their business. How does our “protection effect” mecha-
nism perform against alternative explanations?
Several alternative explanations are compatible with natural resource wealth having a
non significant effect on conflict at the very local level and a significant and substantial
impact at a higher level of aggregation. The first relates to measurement errors and the
potential lack of within-territory variation. Conflict events may be measured with more
noise at the territory level as underlying sources may be less accurate about the precise
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territory in which the event takes place. This would generate relatively larger standard
errors in our analysis at the territory level. We cannot completely rule out this explana-
tion. However, repeating the analysis with the two most commonly used geo-referenced
dataset on conflict (ACLED and UCDP) does not affect our findings. Moreover, this criti-
cism would likewise invalidate a substantial share of recent conflict studies which moved
the focus of the analysis to more disaggregated geographic levels. We also argue that the
ecological fallacy cannot be explained by a difference in variations between the two sam-
ples. First, our findings in Section 5 show that there is enough variation at the territory
level to efficiently estimate the relationship of interest, provided the specification is in
line with the theoretical mechanism linking mineral concessions and conflicts. Second,
implementing an ANOVA analysis on the two samples suggests that the within-territory
variation is actually larger than the within-district one.
Second, it could still be asserted that the ecological fallacy results from the too restric-
tive nature of the territorial boundaries that forebis us to identify the relationship between
mining activities and conflict but also to capture the relationship between any unobserved
variable and conflict. The use of territory/district fixed effects overcomes such criticisms.
Unobserved factors linked to both conflict and mineral concessions may, however, change
over time in a different way at the territory or district levels. That could explain why ag-
gregation at the district level yields different results than at the territory level. That would
also lead to the misleading interpretation that has been given to spatially lagged variables
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(Corrado anbd Fingleton 2012). Using socio-economic data from Demographic Health
Survey from 2007 (endogenous to conflict), we compare territories (or districts) whose
number of conflict events or mineral concessions lies above the sample-average, versus
the others: conflict-prone areas have higher shares of illiterate people, while relatively
minerals-rich areas have better access to services (e.g., running water and electricity) and
have slightly higher wealth indices. Most importantly, however, there is no systematic dif-
ferences between the territory and the district levels, suggesting that the restrictive nature
of the territorial boundaries cannot be the feature driving the ecological fallacy (results
are reported in the supplementary materials).
Third, it is possible that we are capturing at the territory level alternative centrifugal
forces to the “protection effect” proposed in the theoretical model. One such possibility
would be that mining activities are expanding next to existing mining locations, yet mov-
ing accross territorial boundaries. This could not explain the negative coefficient obtained
for the granting of concessions in the same territory but it could explain the conflictive
impact on neighboring territories. We address this concern and do not find any evidence
of such a centrifugal expansion of concessions: the number of historical concessions is
strongly associated with the total number of concessions granted between 1997 and 2007
but not with the total number granted in neighboring territories (results are reported in the
supplementary materials).
Fourth, the presence of valuable minerals may translate into a higher opportunity cost
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for armed group potential recruits, thereby generating a pacifying effect at the local level.
This is an appealing theory, well established in the conflict literature. There are a number
of reasons why we do not believe opportunity cost to be the mechanism driving our results.
First, it can not account for the increase in conflict generated by minerals in neighboring
territories (effect highlighted in Table 7). Neither is it consistent with the reality of DRC
conflicts, where many of the armed factions were substantially composed by foreigners
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004, Prunier 2009). Finally, even if local recruitment was
affected by mining activities, the opportunity cost channel cannot explain the location of
the violence: irrespective of the area of recruitment, why would the fighting occur at a
certain distance from the mining site?
Next, expanding mining activities may displace farmers by taking over lands previ-
ously used for agricultural purposes. Displaced farmers might move into neighboring
territories and join armed groups if alternative economic activities are not available. We
cannot exclude a displacement of farmers taking place, following the granting of new
mining concessions. If minerals were an important factor in the violence experienced in
DRC (as argued here and in a variety of historical accounts), however, this mechanism
fails to explain why conflict is located far from the mining sites.
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7 Conclusion
We explore the mineral resources-conflict nexus by focusing on the mineral-rich and
conflict-ridden Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1997 to 2007. Using geo-referenced
data, we investigate whether the DRC government’s granting of mineral concessions in
particular geographical areas has had an impact on the intensity of conflict. To overcome
endogeneity concerns, we instrument concessions granted over the period of analysis by
the interaction of historical concessions with the prices of mineral resources. Our study
reveals what appears to be a case of ecological fallacy: At the territory level, granting
concessions does not affect the level of conflict; at the district level, however, the right to
exploit mineral wealth is shown to exacerbate the level of violence.
To rationalize this finding, we set up a theoretical model which relies on the incentives
of violent entrepreneurs to protect the mining activities by avoiding armed confrontations
with competing armed groups nearby the mining activity. Securing a peaceful environ-
ment close to the mining sites enhances the mining laborers’ security, thereby reducing the
cost of the labor force for the company that controls the mining location. A larger number
of mining sites in a particular geographical location is shown to increase the intensity of
conflict and to provoke a displacement of conflict to more remote locations.
By incorporating the spatial dimension in the econometric analysis we are able to
demonstrate that a displacement of violence is indeed taking place as a consequence of the
granting of mining permits, hence providing evidence that is supportive of our theoretical
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mechanism. Increases in the granting of mining concessions in a neighbouring territory
significantly increases the risk of conflict. Moreover, the granting of mining concessions
in a particular territory is shown to decrease the level of violence when we account for
such spatial effects.
Our paper therefore brings forward a crucial element in the understanding of the roots
of conflicts, namely the importance of the geographical unit of observation. Neglecting
the spatial dimension may misguide policies. Indeed, we have shown that natural re-
sources may constitute a blessing for populations located in the neighborhood of mines
since resource-greedy entrepreneurs will deploy means to protect their source of income.
The same resources, however, can be characterized as a curse for the wider geographical
area since the conflicts in surrounding areas are likely to become more intense.
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8 Appendix
Existence of equilibrium
To show that there exists an equilibrium for this game, it is sufficient to show that the
incumbent’s utility function is quasi-concave in his decision variables. Let us sequentially
consider the second order conditions.
∂2ui(xm)
∂x2m
= p(xi, xc, dv)n
(
2ϕ
′
(xm)− 2τ(1− dv) + ϕ′′(xm)xm
)
(14)
To establish the utility function’s quasi-concavity, it is sufficient to show that ∂pi(xm)/∂xm ≤
0 ⇒ ∂2pi(xm)/∂x2m < 0. Notice first that in the above bracketed expression, the
third term is negative. A sufficient condition for establishing the unicity of x∗m is that
∂pi(xm)/∂xm ≤ 0⇒ ϕ′(xm) < τ(1− dv) < 0
We can next re-express ∂pi(xm)/∂xm ≤ 0 as:
ϕ
′
(xm) ≤ 2τ(1− dv)− ϕ(xm)− yf
xm
Thus, to establish (strict) quasi-concavity, it is sufficient to show that:
2τ(1− dv)− ϕ(xm)− yf
xm
< τ(1− dv)⇔ τ(1− dv)xm < ϕ(xm)− yf
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And since this last inequality is always verified if pi(xm) > 0, we can deduce that
there exists a unique xm(xi, xc, dm).
The others SOCs are given by:
∂2ui
∂d2v
=
e
′′
(dv)g(xi)g(xc)(g(xi) + g(xc))− 2(e′(dv))2g(xi)2g(xc)
(e(dv)g(xi) + g(xc))3
pi(xm, dv)
+2
e
′
(dv)g(xi)g(xc)
(e(dv)g(xi) + g(xj))2
τnx2m − c(dv)
′′
< 0 (15)
∂2ui
∂x2i
= pxixi(xi, xc)pi(xm, dv) < 0 (16)
The sign of the last expression is a consequence of pxixi ≤ 0, which can straightfor-
wardly be computed.
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Table 2: Panel Unit Root Test
Level of Analysis: Territory District
Conflict Number 6470.2*** 1489.46***
Violent Conflict 6432.27*** 1503.91***
(Log) Concessions 4390.79*** 1035.36***
Price Index 0.193 0.174
Note: *** p< 0.01
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Table 4: Robustness checks on the ecological fallacy.
Level of analysis: Territory District
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Conflicts Violent Conflicts Violent
Conflicts Conflicts
A: Excluding Kinshasa -0.111 0.0118 1.759** 1.659**
(0.166) (0.138) (0.811) (0.728)
B: Excluding Kivus 0.0402 0.0416 0.142** 0.114*
(0.0442) (0.0432) (0.0647) (0.0603)
C: Sample after June 2003 0.139 0.120 1.529** 1.346**
(0.0858) (0.0791) (0.711) (0.619)
D: Dropping 1986 concessions -0.113 0.0139 1.759** 1.659**
(0.180) (0.150) (0.811) (0.728)
E: Dropping 1986 concessions and 0.0426 0.109 1.382* 1.285*
observations before March 2000 (0.162) (0.141) (0.761) (0.682)
F: Concessions size (log) -7.32e-10 9.36e-11 0.642** 0.601**
(1.16e-09) (9.69e-10) (0.290) (0.260)
G: Demand for concessions 0.825 -0.809 1.541** 1.442**
(2.689) (2.296) (0.704) (0.632)
H: Non logged concessions -0.0853 0.0109 0.630* 0.590*
(0.136) (0.113) (0.363) (0.330)
I: Using UCDP conflict data 0.0889 0.885**
(0.0543) (0.361)
J: Conflict dummy (=1 if any -0.0166 0.0185 0.107** 0.117**
conflict event recorded) (0.0462) (0.0432) (0.0475) (0.0486)
Notes: Only the coefficient for concessions in the second stage reported. First
stage always significant. All regressions control for territory/district FE, year
month FE, rainfall anomalies and square rainfall anomalies. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Lagrange Multiplier tests for spatial correlations
Level of analysis: Territory District
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Conflicts Violent Conflicts Violent
Conflicts Conflicts
(Log) Concessions:
Spatial lag 73.69*** 73.69*** 3.2 3.8
Spatial error 73.49*** 73.49*** 2.7 3.4
Note: *** p<0.01
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Figure 1: Distribution of ACLED conflict events in the DRC, 1997-2007
fig1.png
Note: Green points represent the raw ACLED events.
Source: Authors’ construction based on ACLED data (Raleigh et al. 2010). Note: Green points
represent the raw ACLED events.
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Figure 2: Number of ACLED conflict events in the DRC, 1997-2010)
fig2.png
Source: Authors’ construction based on ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010).
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Figure 3: Distribution of UCDP conflict events in the DRC, 1997-2007
fig3.png
Note: Points represent the UCDP events.
Source: Authors’ construction based on UCDP (Sunderg et al. 2012).
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Figure 4: Distribution of mining concessions in the DRC
fig4b.png
Source: Authors’ construction based on DRC Ministry of Mining data.
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